Abstract The paper considers the complexity of verifying that a finite state system satisfies a number of definitions of information flow security. The systems model considered is one in which agents operate synchronously with awareness of the global clock. This enables timing based attacks to be captured, whereas previous work on this topic has dealt primarily with asynchronous systems. Versions of the notions of nondeducibility on inputs, nondeducibility on strategies, and an unwinding based notion are formulated for this model. All three notions are shown to be decidable, and their computational complexity is characterised.
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Notation
Otherwise stated, we use standard notation from automata theory. Given a finite set (alphabet) A, we write A * for the set of finite words over A. We denote the empty word by , and for w ∈ A * , we write |w| for the length of w. For n ∈ N, A n stands for the set of words of length n over A.
Synchronous Machines
We work with a synchronous, non-deterministic state machine model for two agents, H and L. At each step of the computation, the agents (simultaneously) perform an action, which is resolved non-deterministically into a state transition. Both agents make (possibly incomplete) observations of the state of the system, and do so with awareness of the time. Time is discrete and measured by the number of steps in a computation. Our machine model is given in the following definition. We do not make any finiteness assumptions in this section and the results in this section hold for this unconstrained model.
Definition 1 (Synchronous Machine)
A synchronous machine M is a tuple of the form S, A, s 0 , →, O, obs where -S is the set of states, -A = A H × A L is a set of joint actions (or joint inputs), each composed of an action of H from the set A H and an action of L from the set A L , -s 0 is the initial state, -→⊆ S × A × S defines state transitions resulting from the joint actions, -O is a set of observations, -obs : S × {H, L} → O represents the observations made by each agent in each state.
We write obs u for the mapping obs(·, u) : S → O, and s a − − → s for s, a, s ∈→. We assume that machines are input-enabled, by requiring that for all s ∈ S and a ∈ A, there exists s ∈ S such that s a − − → s . We write M s for the set of synchronous machines.
A run r of M is a finite sequence r = s 0 a 1 s 1 . . . a n s n with: a i ∈ A and s i a i+1
− −− → s i+1 for all i = 0 . . . n − 1. We write R(M ) for the set of all runs of M . We denote the sequence of joint actions a 1 . . . a n in the run r by Act(r). For each agent u ∈ {H, L} we define proj u : A → A u to be the projection of joint actions onto agent u's actions. We write Act u (r) for the sequence of agent u's actions in Act(r), e.g., if Act(r) = a 1 . . . a n then Act u (r) = proj u (a 1 ) . . . proj u (a n ).
Agent Views
For a sequence w, and 1 ≤ i ≤ |w|, we write w i for the i-th element of w, and w[i] for the prefix of w up to the i-th element. We assume agents have a synchronous view of the machine, making an observation at each moment of time and being aware of each of their own actions (but not the actions of the other agent, which are given simultaneously and independently). Given a synchronous machine M , and u ∈ {H, L}, we define u views by the mapping view u : R(M ) → O(A u O)
* by: view u (s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 · · · a n s n ) = obs u (s 0 ) proj u (a 1 ) obs u (s 1 ) proj u (a 2 ) · · · proj u (a n ) obs u (s n ).
Intuitively, this says that an agent's view of a run is the history of all its state observations as well as its own actions in the run. We say that a sequence v of observations and actions is a possible u view in a system M if there exists a run r of M such that v = view u (r). The mapping view u extends straightforwardly to sets of runs R ⊆ R(M ), by view u (R) = {view u (r) | r ∈ R}. We define the length |v| of a view v to be the number of actions it contains.
Expressiveness Issues
We remark that the model is sufficiently expressive to represent an alternate model in which agents act in turn under the control of a scheduler. We say that a synchronous machine is scheduled if for each state s ∈ S either -for all actions a ∈ A H and b, b ∈ A L , and states t ∈ S, s Intuitively, in a synchronous system, L always knows how many actions H has performed, since this is always identical to the number of actions that L has itself performed. In particular, if L has made view v, then L knows that H has performed |v| actions. The definition says that the system is secure if this is all that L can learn about what sequence of actions H has performed. Whatever L observes is consistent with any sequence of actions by H of this length 1 . More precisely, define K L (v) for an L view v to be the set of H action sequences Act H (r) for r a run with v = view L (r); this represents what L knows about H's actions in the run. Then M ∈ NDI iff for all possible L views v we have K L (v) = A |v| H . The definition of NDI takes the viewpoint that a system is secure if it is not possible for L to make any nontrivial deductions about H behaviour, provided that H does not actively seek to communicate information to L. This is an appropriate definition when H is trusted not to deliberately act so as to communicate information to L, and the context is one where H is equally likely to engage in any of its possible behaviours. In some circumstances, however, NDI proves to be too weak a notion of security. In particular, this is the case if the attack model against which the system must be secure includes the possibility of Trojan Horses at the H end of the system, which must be prevented from communicating H secrets to L. The following example, due in essence to Wittbold and Johnson [WJ90] shows that it is possible for a system to satisfy NDI, but still allow for L to deduce H information.
Example 1 We present a synchronous machine that satisfies NDI in Fig. 1 . We use the convention in such figures that the observations are shown on a state s in the form of obs H (s)/obs L (s). Edges are labelled with joint actions (a, a ) where a ∈ A H and a ∈ A L . When a is x this means that there is such an edge for all a ∈ A H . In this example the action sets are A H = {0, 1}, A L = {0}. Note that in state s 1 and s 2 , L's observation in the next state is determined as the exclusive-or of H's current observation and H's action. The system is in NDI since every H action sequence is compatible with every L view of the same length. For example, the L view 00000 is consistent with H action sequence 00 and 10 (path s 0 s 1 s 3 ) and with H action sequence 01 and 11 (path s 0 s 2 s 3 ). Nevertheless, H can communicate a bit b of information to L, as follows. Note that H is able to distinguish between state s 1 and s 2 by means of the observation it makes on these states (at time 1). Suppose b = 1, then H chooses action 1 at s 1 and action 0 at s 2 ; in either case the next state is s 4 , and L observes 1. Alternately, if b = 0, then H chooses action 0 at s 1 and action 1 at s 2 ; in either case the next state is s 3 , and L observes 0. Whatever the value of b, H has guaranteed that L observes b at time 2, so this bit has been communicated. Intuitively, this means that the system fails to block Trojan Horses at H from communicating with L, even though it satisfies NDI. (The structure can be repeated so that H can communicate a message of any length to L in plain text.)
Non-Deducibility on Strategies
The essence of Example 1 is that L is able to deduce H secrets based not just on its knowledge of the system, but also its knowledge that H is following a particular strategy for communication of information to L. In response to this example, Wittbold and Johnson proposed the following stronger definition of security that they called non-deducibility on strategies. To state this definition, we first formalize the possible communication strategies that can be used by H. Intuitively, H's behaviour may depend on what H has been able to observe in the system. Definition 3 (H Strategy, Consistent Runs) An H strategy in M is a function π : view H (R(M )) → A H mapping each possible view of H (in M ) to an H action. A run r = s 0 a 1 s 1 . . . a n s n of M is consistent 1 Recall that M is input-enabled.
with an H strategy π if for all i = 0 . . . n − 1, we have proj H (a i+1 ) = π(view H (s 0 a 1 s 1 . . . a i s i )). We write R(M, π) for the set of runs of M that are consistent with the H strategy π.
We can now state Wittbold and Johnson's definition.
Definition 4 A synchronous system M satisfies Nondeducibility on Strategies
Intuitively, this definition says that the system is secure if L is not able to distinguish between different H strategies by means of its views. In Example 1, given an H strategy π 1 satisfying π 1 (0x0) = 0 and π 1 (0x1) = 1, and another H strategy π 2 satisfying π 2 (0x0) = 1 and π 2 (0x1) = 0, we have the L view 00001 in view L (R(M, π 2 ) but not in view L (R(M, π 1 )). Thus, the sets of L views differ for these two strategies, so the system is not in NDS.
An alternate formulation of the definition can be obtained by noting that for every possible L view v, there is an H strategy π such that v ∈ view L (R(M, π)), viz., if v = view L (r), we take π to be a strategy that always performs the same action at each time i < |r| as H performs at time i in r. Thus, we can state the definition as follows:
Conversely, suppose that M ∈ NDS, and let π be any strategy. Plainly
) be a possible L view. By the above observation there exists a strategy
This formulation makes it clear that H cannot communicate any information to L by means of its strategies. It is also apparent that allowing H strategies to be non-deterministic (i.e., functions from H views to a set of H actions) would not lead to a different definition of NDS, since the more choices H has in a strategy the more L-views are compatible with that strategy. We remark that in asynchronous systems (in which we use an asynchronous notion of view), similarly defined notions of non-deducibility on inputs and non-deducibility on strategies turn out to be equivalent [FG95, vdMZ10] . The example 1 above shows that this is not the case in synchronous machines, where the two notions are distinct.
Unwinding Relations
Nondeducibility-based definitions of security are quite intuitive, but they turn out to have some disadvantages as a basis for secure systems development. One is that they are not compositional: combining two systems, each secure according to such a definition, can produce a compound system that is not secure [McC88] . For this reason, some stronger, but less intuitive definitions have been advocated in the literature.
One of these, McCullough's notion of restrictiveness [McC88] , is closely related to an approach to formal proof of systems security based on what are known as "unwinding relations." A variety of definitions of unwinding relations have been proposed in the literature [GM84, Rus92, Man00b, BFPR03] , in the context of a number of different underlying systems models and associated definitions of security for which they are intended to provide a proof technique. We propose here a variant of such definitions that is appropriate to the machine model we consider in this paper, drawing on definitions proposed by van der Meyden and Zhang [vdMZ08] for machines acting under the control of a scheduler.
Definition 5 (Synchronous Unwinding Relation) A synchronous unwinding relation on a system M is a symmetric relation ∼⊆ S × S satisfying the following:
, and 3. s ∼ t implies that for all a 1 , a 2 ∈ A H and a 3 ∈ A L , if s − −−−− → t , and s ∼ t .
Intuitively, an unwinding relation is a bisimulation-like relation over S that shows L observations are locally uncorrelated with H actions. Definition 6 A synchronous machine M satisfies restrictiveness (M ∈ RES), if there exists a synchronous unwinding relation on M .
Part of the significance of RES is that it provides a proof technique for our notions of nondeducibility, as shown by the following result, which relates the three notions of security we have introduced:
The following containments hold and are strict: RES ⊂ NDS ⊂ NDI.
Proof To show that RES ⊆ NDS we argue as follows. Suppose that ∼ is a synchronous unwinding on M . Let v be any possible L view, and π any H strategy. We have to show that v ∈ view L (R(M, π)). For this, let r = s 0 a 1 s 1 . . . a n s n be a run such that v = view L (r). We show that there exists a run r = s 0 a 1 s 1 . . . a n s n consistent with π such that v = view L (r ). We proceed inductively, showing for each
, where s 0 a 1 s 1 . . . a i s i is a run consistent with π. In the base case, we have s 0 = s 0 and the claim is trivial. For the inductive case, let a = π(view H (s 0 a 1 s 1 . . . a i s i )) and b = proj L (a i+1 ), and take 
as required. Next we show that NDS ⊆ NDI. Let α ∈ A * H and v be an L observation satisfying |α| = |v|. We construct a "blind" H strategy π as π(v ) = α |v |+1 if |v | < |α| and π(v ) = a H otherwise, where a H is an arbitrary action in A H . Since M ∈ NDS, we have view L (R(M, π)) = view L (R(M )), so there exists a run r ∈ R(M, π) such that view L (r) = v. By the construction of π we have Act H (r) = α.
That the inclusions are strict follows from Example 1 and Example 2 below.
Example 2 We present a machine in Fig. 2 that satisfies NDS but does not satisfy RES. In this system we let A H = {0, 1}, A L = {0}. We use the conventions from Example 1. One may easily observe that the set of L views is given by the regular language 000((00) * + (01) * ) and all the views are compatible with every possible H strategy. However, there does not exist a synchronous unwinding relation. Suppose there were such a relation ∼. Then s 0 ∼ s 0 , and for joint actions (0, 0) and (1, 0), we have s 0 − −− → s 3 , and we would require s 1 to be related to either s 2 or s 3 . However, neither s 2 nor s 3 can be related to s 1 : from s 2 user L can only observe (00) * in the future, and from s 3 only (01) * can be observed by L. Note from s 1 both (00) * and (01) * are possible for L.
In the following sections, we study the complexity of the notions of security we have defined above.
Synchronous Nondeducibility on Inputs
In this section we establish the following result:
Theorem 2 For the class of finite state synchronous machines, NDI is PSPACE-complete with respect to logspace reductions.
PSPACE-Easiness
Stating the definition in the negative, a system is not in NDI if there exists an L view v and a sequence of H actions α with |α| = |v| such that there exists no run r with Act H (r) = α and view L (r) = v. We show that NDI is decidable by a procedure that searches for such an L view v and H action sequence α. The key element of the proof is to show that we need to maintain only a limited amount of information during this search, so that we can bound the length of the witness (v, α), and the amount of space needed to show that such a witness exists.
To show this, suppose we are given a machine M = S, A, s 0 , →, O, obs . Given a sequence α ∈ A * H and a sequence v ∈ O(A L O) * , we define the set K(α, v) to be the set of all final states of runs r of M consistent with α and v, i.e., such that Act H (r) = α and view L (r) = v. For each a ∈ A H , b ∈ A L and o ∈ O, we also define the function δ a,b,o : P(S) → P(S), by δ a,b,o (T ) = {t ∈ S | for some t ∈ T we have t − −− → t and obs L (t) = o} .
For the system M define the labelled transition system LT S(M ) = (Q, Σ, q 0 , ⇒) as follows:
Intuitively, the component s in a state (s, T ) ∈ Q is used to ensure that we generate an L view v that is in fact possible. The components a, b in a transition (s, T ) ⇒ (a,b,a ) (s , T ) represent the actions used to generate the run underlying v, and the component a is used to generate a sequence α. The set T represents K(α, v). More precisely, we have the following result:
is a possible L view, and α = a 1 . . . a n is a sequence of H actions such that |v| = |α| and K(α, v) = T n .
Conversely, for every possible L view v with |v| = n, and sequence of H actions α = a 1 . . . a n , there exists a path , v) ), suppose that t ∈ K(αa, vbo). Then there exists a run r of M such that Act H (r) = αa and view L (r) = vbo and the final state of r is t. It follows that obs L (t) = o.
Thus, we may write r = r 
Taking r = r − −− → t, we see that r is a run of M with Act H (r) = αa and view L (r ) = vbo. Thus, t ∈ K(αa, vbo), as required. This completes the proof that K(αa, vbo) = δ a,b,o (K(α, v)).
We can now prove the two parts of the result:
, it follows from the above using a straightforward induction that T n = K(α, v), where α = a 1 . . . a n . 
Given a sequence of H actions α = a 1 . . . a n , we inductively define T 0 = {s 0 } and 
. By a straightforward induction using what was proved above, we have that T n = K(α, v), where α = a 1 . . . a n and v = obs
We now note that for an H action sequence α and a possible L view v, with |v| = |α|, there exists no run r such that Act H (r) = α and view L (r) = v iff K(α, v) = ∅. The existence of such a pair (α, v), is therefore equivalent, by Lemma 1, to the existence of a path in LT S(M ) from q 0 to a state (s, T ) with T = ∅. This can be decided in NSPACE(O(|M |)) = DSPACE(O(|M | 2 )) ⊆ PSPACE. This proves the following theorem.
Theorem 3 M ∈ NDI is decidable in PSPACE.
We note, moreover, that since there are at most |S| × 2 |S| states in Q, if there exists a pair (α, v) witnessing that M ∈ NDI there exists such a pair with |α| ≤ |S| × 2 |S| .
PSPACE-Hardness
We show that NDI is PSPACE-hard already in the special case of scheduled machines. The proof is by a polynomial time reduction from the problem of deciding, given a non-deterministic finite state automaton A on alphabet Σ, if the language L(A) accepted by A is equal to Σ * . This Universality problem is PSPACEhard [SM73] .
Let A = Q, Q 0 , Σ, δ, F be a non-deterministic finite state automaton (without ε-transitions), with states Q, initial states Q 0 ⊆ Q, alphabet Σ, transition function δ : Q × Σ → P(Q), and final states 
-obs : {H, L} × S → O with obs H (s) = 0 for all s ∈ S and obs L (s) = 0 for all s ∈ S \ {s 2 }, and obs L (s 2 ) = 1. -−→⊆ S × A × S is defined as consisting of the following transitions (using the convention noted above)
The construction of M (A) from A can be done in logspace.
Intuitively, the runs of M (A) produce two sets of L views, depending on whether the first H action is h or h . In all circumstances, runs in which H does h in the first step, with the first transition to s 1 , produce an L view for each sequence in 0Σ1(Σ1) * or 0Σ0(Σ0) * (Σ1) * by switching from to s 2 at the first occurrence of observation 1. Runs in which H does h in the first step with a transition to a state in Q 0 , correspond to simulations of A and produce two types of L views:
1. any sequence in 0Σ0(Σ0) * (by means of a run that stays in Q for as long as possible, and moves to s 3 whenever an action is not enabled), and 2. any sequence of the form 0Σ0b 1 0 . . . b n−1 0b n 1(Σ1) * with b 1 . . . b n ∈ L(A) (these come from runs that pass through Q and then jump to s 2 ).
In case ε ∈ L(A), i.e., Q 0 ∩ F = ∅, then also all sequences in 0Σ1(Σ1)
* are produced as the L view on a run in which the first transition, with H action h, is to s 2 .
Note that since L is always scheduled after the first step, replacing any action by H after the first step in a run by any other action of H results in another run, with no change to the L view. Thus, the only thing that needs to be checked to determine whether M (A) ∈ NDI is whether the same can be said for the first step. Moreover, it can be seen from the above that, for all A, and independently of whether ε ∈ L(A), any L view obtained from a run in which the first H action is h can also be obtained from a run in which the first H action is h . Thus, to show M (A) ∈ NDI, it suffices to check that any L view obtained from a run in which the first H action is h can also be obtained from a run in which the first action is h.
Proof For the 'only if' part, suppose L(A) = Σ * . We show that M (A) ∈ NDI. As argued above, it suffices to show that any view obtained from a run in which the first H action is h can also be obtained from a run in which the first action is h. − −−− → s 2 we obtain a run with first H action h that has exactly the same L view. Otherwise t 1 = s 1 . If all obs L (t i ) = 0 then we may construct a run of M (A) with the same L view as r by taking any transition into Q in the first step, then remaining within Q throughout, or making a transition to s 3 if there is no enabled transition of A on the given input b i . Otherwise, let i be the least index with obs
exists a run q 0
is a run with the same L view as r but with first H action h. Thus, M (A) ∈ NDI.
For the 'if' part, suppose there is a word w = a 1 a 2 . . . a n ∈ L(A). If w = ε, then the transition − −−− → s 1 . Otherwise, for an arbitrary a 0 ∈ Σ, the L view 0a 0 0a 1 0a 2 . . . a n 1 cannot be obtained from runs in which the first H action is h, because otherwise w would be accepted by A. However this view is obtained from a run in which the first action is h . Therefore M (A) ∈ NDI.
As pointed out at the beginning of this section, this lower bound result already holds for scheduled machines, and thus NDI is already PSPACE-hard for this subclass.
Nondeducibility on Strategies
In this section we establish the following theorem:
Theorem 4 For the class of finite state synchronous machines, and with respect to log-space reductions, NDS is EXPSPACE-complete.
EXPSPACE-Easiness
For the proof that NDS is decidable in EXPSPACE, we show that the problem is in DSPACE(2 O(|M |) ). It is convenient for this section to consider strategies π that are defined over the larger set V H = O(A H O) * of candidate views of H, rather than the subset view H (R(M )) of possible views.
We use the characterization of NDS given in Proposition 1. Let π be an H strategy, and β be an L view. Say that π excludes β if there does not exist a run r consistent with π such that β = view L (r). Since always R(M, π) ⊆ R(M ), by Proposition 1, a system M satisfies NDS if and only if it is not the case that there exists a possible L view β in M and a strategy π such that π excludes β.
Our decidability result and complexity bound is obtained by showing that if such a strategy exists, then there is one of a particular normal form, and it can be found using a space-bounded search. The normal form strategies have a uniform structure, in that the choice of next action on an H view depends only on the length of the view and the set of states that H considers possible after that view, given that L's view β has not yet been excluded. We call this set of states H's knowledge set.
More precisely, the knowledge sets are defined as follows. Given a candidate
* with |α| ≤ |β|, define K(α, π, β) to be the set of all final states of runs r consistent with π such that view H (r) = α and view L (r) is a prefix of β.
These knowledge sets can be obtained in an incremental way using the update operators
The incremental characterisation is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose that π(α) = a H and |α| = |β|.
Proof We first show that
Thus there exists a run r, consistent with π, and with final state s, such that view H (r) = α and view L (r) = β. Since π(α) = a H , we obtain that the run r (a H , a L ) t is consistent with π and justifies
Then there exists a run r consistent with π, which can be written in the form r (a H , a L ) t with view H (r) = α, and obs H (t) = o H , and view L (r) = β and obs L (t) = o L . Let s be the final state of r. Then we have s ∈ K(α, π, β). It is now immediate that
The following result shows that it suffices to consider strategies in which the choice of action depends only on the time and H's knowledge set, given the L view being excluded.
Lemma 3 If there exists an H strategy π that excludes β, then there exists an H strategy π that also excludes β, and has the property that for all H views α and α , if
Proof Suppose that π excludes β. For purposes of the proof, note that we can assume without loss of generality that β is infinite -this helps to avoid mention of views longer than β as a separate case. (Note that it is equivalent to say that π excludes some prefix of β.)
Let f be any mapping from V H to V H such that for all α, α ∈ V H we have
Such a mapping always exists; intuitively, it merely picks, at each length, a representative f (α) ∈ [α] ∼ of the equivalence classes of the equivalence relation defined by α ∼ α if |α| = |α | and K(α, π, β) = K(α , π, β). Now define the mapping g on V H as follows. Let α 0 = obs H (s 0 ) be the only possible H view of length 0. For α ∈ V H of length 0, we define g(α) = α. For longer α, we define g(αao) = f (g(α))π(f (g(α))o. Also, define the strategy π by π (α) = π(f (g(α))).
We claim that for all α ∈ V H we have K(α, π , β) = K(g(α), π, β). The proof is by induction on the length of α. The base case is straightforward, since α 0 is consistent with all strategies, so K(α 0 , π , β) = {s 0 } = K(α 0 , π, β), and K(α, π , β) = ∅ = K(α, π, β) for α = α 0 with |α| = 0. Suppose the claim holds for α ∈ V H of length i. Let αao ∈ V H . By induction and (2),
To see that π has the required property, if K(α, π , β) = K(α , π , β) with |α| = |α |, then we have
Since π excludes β, there exists a length n such that for all α ∈ V H with |α| = n, we have K(α, π, β) = ∅. Thus, we also have for all α of length n that K(α, π , β) = K(g(α), π, β) = ∅. This means that π also excludes β.
Based on Lemma 3, we construct a transition system T (M ) = (Q, q 0 ⇒) that simultaneously searches for the strategy π and an L view β that is excluded by π. The components are defined by:
Intuitively, the component U in a state (U, K) is used to ensure that the view β that we construct is in fact possible in M . The component K represents a collection of all possible knowledge sets that H can be in at a certain point of time, while attempting to exclude β. More specifically, each set k in K corresponds to α ∈ V H such that k = K(α, π, β). In a transition, we both determine the next phase of π, by extending π so that π(α) = ρ(K(α, π, β)), and extend β to βa L o L . Moreover, an H strategy generated by T (M ) is only sensitive to H's knowledge set and lengths of runs, i.e., it satisfies that K(α, π , β) = K(α , π , β) and |α| = |α | implies π (α) = π (α ). In the above construct, ρ represents the local choice of H that depends only on the knowledge set of H.
The following result justifies the correspondence between the transition system T (M ) and NDS.
Lemma 4 A machine M does not satisfy NDS iff T (M ) contains a path q 0 ⇒ * (U, K) to a state where
Proof We first prove the implication from left to right. Suppose first that M does not satisfy NDS, witnessed by the fact that π excludes the possible
We may assume without loss of generality that no strict prefix of β is excluded. By Lemma 3, we may assume that π has the property that it takes the same value on H views α, α that have the same length and have K(α, π, β) = K(α , π, β). We construct a path
in the transition system T (M ), by defining the functions ρ i : K i−1 → A H for i ≥ 1, and then deriving U i from U i−1 using the equation in clause 3(b) of the definition of T (M ), and deriving K i from K i−1 and ρ i using the equation in clause 3(c). (This guarantees that each step satisfies all the conditions of the definition of ⇒, except the requirement in 3(b) that U = ∅; we check this below.) The construction will have the property that every k ∈ K i−1 is equal to some K(α, π, β) with α ∈ V H of length i − 1. This means that we may define ρ i (k) = π(α). Note that ρ i is well-defined, by the assumption on π. More precisely, we claim that
Note that this means that if k ∈ K n then k = ∅, for else we have an H view α of length |β| such that K(α, π, β) = ∅, which implies that π does not exclude β. Thus K n = ∅, as required for the right hand side of the result. The proof of the claim is by induction on i. The base case of n = 0 is immediate from that fact that β is a possible view, so
It remains to show that U i = ∅ for each i = 1 . . . n. For this, note that since β is a possible L view, there exists a run s 0
For the other direction, suppose that
and K n = {∅}. We construct a strategy π that excludes β = obs L (s 0 )b 1 o 1 . . . b n o n . A straightforward induction using clause 3(b) of the definition of T (M ) shows that β is a possible L view in M . The construction of π is done inductively, by defining a sequence of strategies π 0 , π 1 , . . . , π n such that if i ≤ j then π i and π j agree on all H views of length at most i − 1. At each stage of the construction, we claim that for all H views α of length
Inductively, we let π 0 be any strategy and define
otherwise. Evidently, π i+1 is well defined by the claim that K(α, π i , β) = ∅ then K(α, π i , β) ∈ K i . Also this definition plainly satisfies the condition that if i ≤ j then π i and π j agree on all views of length at most i − 1. Note also that since K n = {∅}, by the claim there does not exist an H view α of length n such that K(α, π n , β) = ∅. It follows that π n excludes β. It therefore suffices to show that the definition satisfies the claim. Note that it holds trivially for any strategy if i = 0. Suppose that for all H views α of length i, if
Since π i and π i+1 agree on views of length at most i − 1, we also have
We obtain the claimed complexity bound from Lemma 4, simply by noting that it reduces NDS to a reachability problem in the transition system T (M ). Since the states of the system T (M ) can be represented in space O(|S| · 2 |S| ) = 2 O(|S|) , we obtain from Savitch's theorem that we can do the search in DSPACE(2 O(|S|) ).
EXPSPACE-Hardness
To show that NDS is EXPSPACE-hard, we show how to encode the game BLIND-PEEK of Reif [Rei84] . We need only scheduled machines for the encoding, so the problem is EXPSPACE-hard already for this subclass.
The Game BLIND-PEEK
BLIND-PEEK is a variant of the two-player game PEEK introduced by Stockmeyer and Chandra [SC79] . A PEEK game consists of a box with two open sides that contains horizontally stacked plates; the players sit at opposite sides of the box. Each plate has two positions, 'in' and 'out', and contains a knob at one side of the box, so that this plate can be controlled by one of the players. At each step, one of the two players may grasp a knob from his side and push it 'in' or 'out'. The player may also pass. Both the top of the box and the plates have holes in various positions, and each hole is associated to a player. If, just after a move of player a ∈ {1, 2}, the plates are positioned so that for one of the player's holes in the top of the box, it is possible to peek through from the top of the box to the bottom (i.e., each plate has a hole positioned directly underneath the top hole), then player a wins. In PEEK, both players can observe the position of all plates at all times. BLIND-PEEK [Rei84] (more formally, the game G 2B of that paper) is a modification of PEEK in which player 1's side of the box is partially covered, so that it is not possible for player 1 to see the positions of the plates controlled by player 2. We may represent the game formally as follows:
Definition 7 An instance G of the BLIND-PEEK game is given by a tuple (n, n 1 , Φ 1 , Φ 2 , ν 0 ) where n and n 1 are natural numbers with n 1 < n,
are disjunctive normal form formulas over the set of atomic propositions {P 1 , . . . , P n }, and ν 0 : [1..n] → {0, 1} represents a boolean assignment to these propositions. The size of the instance is O(n(h 1 + h 2 )).
Here h i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, is the number of holes on the top of the box for each player. Intuitively, n gives the number of plates, and the propositions P k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n correspond to the positions of the plates, which can be either in (P k false) or out (P k true), and a state of the game G is given by a mapping ν : [1..n] → {0, 1}, with P k true at ν just when ν(k) = 1. The total number of states in a game is thus exponential in the size of the game. The assignment ν 0 specifies the initial state of the game. The number n 1 specifies the number of plates associated to player 1; we take these to be plates 1..n 1 . The formula Φ i gives the winning condition for player i. Each disjunct γ i j corresponds to one of the holes on the top of the box that is associated to player i. Which literals are in γ i j depends on how the hole in the top of the box aligns with a hole on the plates when these are in or out. If there is always an alignment with a hole on plate k then γ i j contains neither P k nor ¬P k . If there is an alignment only when the k-th plate is out then γ i j contains the literal P k , and conversely, if there is an alignment only when the k-th plate is in then γ i j contains the literal ¬P k . (If there is never an alignment then we may include both P k and ¬P k , but, obviously, we may just as well remove the hole from the game.)
Players 1 and 2 play in turn by moving one of their plates or passing. As the players' plate numbers partition the set [1 . . . n], we can denote the moves of the players move i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n; if i ∈ [1..n 1 ] it is a move of player 1, and a move of player 2 otherwise. We let Move 1 = {move i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 } ∪ {Pass} and
A play in G is an alternating sequence of player 1 and player 2 moves of the form
We are interested in the problem of deciding whether there is a winning strategy for player 1, i.e., a way for the player to choose their moves that guarantees, whatever the other player does, that player 1 will win. Strategies usually choose a next move based on what the player has been able to observe over a play of the game. In the case of the game G, the information directly visible to player 1 in a state is just the position of plates 1..n 1 . Player 2 sees the position of all plates. A player also remembers the sequence of moves they have played at their turn. At each step of the play, the player is also advised whether any player has won the game. (In a physical realization of the game, if a player were to peek through a hole they would be able to see which is the topmost plate that blocks it. We assume that the player does not get this information in the formal game. One can imagine a physical realization in which a referee peeks through the holes and announces the result.)
Since the winning condition is a discrete, state-based condition, deterministic strategies suffice. Moreover, note that, except for the information about who has won the game, the effect of the players' moves on the information directly visible to player 1 is deterministic: we can deduce the position of player 1's plates from the moves that player 1 has made so far in the game. Thus, every undecided play in which player 1 has made a particular sequence of moves yields the same view for player 1, and on a deterministic strategy, player 1 must make the same next move on all such plays. This means that we may represent a player 1 strategy simply by a (finite or infinite) sequence of moves Λ = λ 1 , λ 3 , λ 5 . . .. Such a strategy is winning for player 1 if every play with this sequence of moves by player 1 is winning for player 1.
The following result characterizes the complexity of BLIND-PEEK.
Theorem 5 [Rei84]
The game BLIND-PEEK is complete for EXPSPACE under log-space reductions.
We use this result to show that NDS is EXPSPACE-hard. Given an instance G of BLIND-PEEK, we construct a synchronous system M (G) of size polynomial in the size of G, with the following property: player 1 has a winning strategy in G iff there exists an L view v L and an H strategy π that excludes v L in M (G).
Intuitively, the winning strategy Λ of player 1 in the game G will be encoded within the sequence of L actions contained in the view v L . The role of the H strategy π in the machine M (G) is to help in the verification that the strategy Λ is winning, by ensuring that the view v L cannot occur when this is the case. As we cannot encode the exponential number of possible states of the BLIND-PEEK game G directly in the polynomial number of states of M (G), we use an encoding trick, which is to represent the state of the game as the set of states of M (G) that are consistent with the H view. Roughly, each such consistent state corresponds to one of the plates; there are some additional states for initialization and book-keeping related to the winning condition.
High level structure of M (G).
We let n 2 = n − n 1 be the number of plates that can be moved by player 2.
The machine M (G) will be a scheduled machine (see Section 2.4), with deterministic schedule following the regular expression ⊥(LHL⊥H h 2 ) ω . Here occurrences of H and L indicate which agent's action the transition is allowed to depend upon, and ⊥ is for a system step that is independent of both agents H and L. We call each instance of the infinitely repeated block LHL⊥H h 2 a round, and use indices, as in L 1 H 0 L 2 ⊥H 1 ..H h 2 to refer to the stages of the round.
The alphabet of actions for L and H are A L and A H defined by:
Informally, the behaviour of M (G) in each step is as follows:
1. In the first ⊥ step of the schedule, the machine nondeterministically makes a transition to one of n subsystems, each of which monitors one particular plate of the game. Neither H nor L is able to see which subsystem they are actually in during subsequent transitions. The machine then moves into the cyclically repeated rounds. 2. The L 1 stage of each round allows L to perform one move of player 1 in the game G (using an action move i ) or to pass (using the action checkwin). This stage corresponds to a move according to a blindfold strategy of player 1. 3. In the following H 0 stage, agent H is given an opportunity to assert that the last L move has achieved a win of player 1, by specifying a hole j of player 1 and claiming that it is possible to peek through (using an action isOpen j ). H may also pass (using any other action). 4. The following L 2 stage allows L to check, by performing a "checkwin" action, if a winning state has been reached, as claimed by H sometime before. If it is so, then some of the L views will be ruled out.
If it is still not a win, or H has not yet asserted a win, or H has made a mistake, this "checkwin" action will not rule out any L view. (Once a "checkwin" fails in this way, no L views will be excluded thereafter.) 5. The next stage ⊥ simulates a move of player 2 in the game G. 6. During the last h 2 stages, agent H is given an opportunity to assert that the last player 2 move is not a win, and explain this claim by pointing, for each of the h 2 peek-holes of player 2, to a plate j that blocks that hole, using an action isBlocking j .
The observations of the agents L, H in M (G) are defined so that neither agent ever learns which plate is being simulated on the current run. Agent L observes the player 1 moves and a result of any "checkwin" actions. Agent H observes all moves by either player. Intuitively, suppose player 1 has a winning strategy and agent L faithfully follows this strategy in the L 1 stage of each round. Suppose also that agent H, who knows every previous move of the play, always makes correct assertions about whether holes are open or blocked. Then L is guaranteed to be able to eventually make a successful "checkwin" and get some L views ruled out. To handle the case where H makes incorrect assertions, the construction ensures that no L view is eliminated if this happens. Thus, the statement that there is some H strategy that eliminates an L view corresponds to the statement that H has a way of making correct assertions in order to show that the player 1 strategy is winning.
States and observations of M (G).
Formally, the state space of M (G) is defined as
where s 0 is the initial state, and the components are as follows:
clock that represents the current stage in a round of the cyclic part of the schedule, -P = {1, . . . n} represents the plate being monitored, -B = {0, 1} encodes whether the current plate is "in" or "out", -M = Move 1 ∪ Move 2 ∪ {⊥} records the most recent move in the play (and ⊥ for simulation steps that do not correspond to game steps), and -F = {(win, ⊥), (error , ⊥), (win, 1), (error , 1), (error , 2)} records the result of claims made by H.
The observation mappings for H and L on these states are given by:
-obs L ((c, r, 1)) = 1 and obs L ((c, r, 2)) = 2, where c ∈ C and r ∈ {win, error }, and obs L (s) = ⊥ for all s not of this form. -obs(s 0 ) = ⊥, and obs H ((c, i, k, a)) = a and obs H (s) = end for all s ∈ C × F. States of M (G) of type (c, i, k, a) ∈ C × P × B × M encode information about the effect of the play of the game so far on a particular plate: c ∈ C indicates the current stage of the simulation, i ∈ [1..n] is a monitored plate, k ∈ B is the position of the plate i and a ∈ M is the most recent move made in the game, or ⊥ if none.
States of M (G) in C × F are used to capture the effect of assertions made by H relating to the winning conditions, and play a key role in ensuring that an L view is eliminated under the appropriate conditions. These states form a "terminal" part of the machine: it is not possible to return to the component C×P×B×M from these states. The C component simply tracks the simulation stages. Figure 3 sketches the way that the F components of these states are used to check winning conditions for the game and to generate observations. Intuitively, at various stages of the simulation (viz., H 0 and H 1 . . . H h 2 ), agent H is allowed to make assertions about the state of the game. When H makes such an assertions, M (G) checks whether they are true at the plate being simulated.
-If the assertion entails that there is not yet a win for player 2, and is true of the present plate, or does not concern the present plate, then we continue the simulation. (Specifically, this case occurs when the assertion is that a particular plate is blocking the hole for player 2 under consideration, and this is true or concerns another plate.) -If the assertion entails a win for player 1 and is true of the present plate, then a transition is made to a state (win, ⊥). (Specifically, the assertion is that a particular player 1 hole is open, and this holds at the present plate.) -The remaining possibility is that the assertion is false. In this case we make a transition to a state (error , ⊥). (We have this case when either the assertion is that a particular player 1 hole is open, but this is false at the present plate, or is that the present plate is blocking a particular player 2 hole, but this is false.)
When L eventually performs a checkwin action in the appropriate phase L 2 , states with (error , ⊥) could produce either the observation 1 or 2. By contrast, states with (win, ⊥) produce only the observation 1. Thus, the win states result in a reduced set of views. Note that we can only check assertions locally at the current plate, and the winning condition for player 1 requires that a player 1 hole be unblocked at all plates. The way that the encoding handles this is via L's uncertainty about which plate is being monitored: if there is any plate at which the hole is blocked, then there will be a run consistent with L's observations, monitoring this plate, at which we have (error , ⊥). When L performs checkwin in this run it will obtain both observations 1 and 2, and the set of views is not reduced.
Transitions of M (G)
In general, transitions in a machine are labelled by joint actions (a H , a L ) of H and L, but since M (G) is a scheduled machine, at most one of these has any effect on the state. To simplify the presentation, we use the convention of writing s b − → t with b ∈ A u , to indicate that the current transition is dependent only on u, and write s τ − → t if the transition is independent of both H and L (i.e., a system step). To capture the scheduler, we define the function next : C → C so that it maps each element of the sequence L 1 , H 0 , L 1 , ⊥, H 1 . . . H h 2 to the element next in the sequence, with next(H h 2 ) = L 1 .
To describe the transitions we use the following predicates relating to the winning conditions. When i ∈ {1, 2} is a player, j = 1..h i is a hole associated to that player, k ∈ P is a plate and b ∈ B is a plate position, we define Open i j (k, b), to be true just when either proposition P k does not occur positively or negatively in γ We group the transitions according to the step of the schedule. We first describe transitions from states in {s 0 } ∪ (C × P × B × M).
Initial
Step ⊥ The initial state of M (G) is s 0 . From this state, we non-deterministically choose one plate to be monitored. This transition does not depend on any agents and has the form
, where ν 0 is the initial state of G.
Stage L 1 At this stage, we simulate player 1's move of a plate j. The special action checkwin is used for the pass move. For each move j ∈ A L , and state (L 1 , i, k, a) there is a transition of the form:
for the pass move.
Stage H 0 At this stage H may try to prove that player 1 can peek through some hole j ∈ [1..h 1 ]. To do this, it chooses an action isOpen j . As it is a guess, H might be wrong. If H claims that player 1 can peek through hole j and this is right at the present plate, we reach a "winning" state in C × F, otherwise an error state. From a plate simulation state (H 0 , i, k, a) there is a transition
where r = win if Open 1 j (i, k), and r = error otherwise. H may also intentionally choose not to declare a win, by performing any of its actions isBlocking j for j ∈ {1 . . . n}. This is captured by the transitions
Stage L 2 At this stage, L can perform the action "checkwin" to check if H has proved a win by player 1. If the current state at this stage is a plate simulation state, then H has not yet claimed a win for player 1, and any past assertions made by H about player 2's winning condition were either true or irrelevant to the current plate. In this case, we do not have evidence for a player 1 win, so we do not wish to eliminate an L view. Thus, from states s = (L 2 , i, k, a), we have transitions so that both observations 1 and 2 can be obtained. Agent L is also allowed to continue playing without checking for a win, by performing any of the actions move j with j ∈ [1 . . . n 1 ]. For this case we have a transition
(We discuss the case of transitions at this stage from states in C × F below.)
Stage ⊥ At this stage, we simulate a move of a plate by player 2. The following transitions are in M (G):
for each i ∈ P, k ∈ B and j ∈ [(n 1 + 1) . . . n] (player 2's plates), and:
To model a pass move by player 2 we also have a transition
Stages H 1 to H h 2 In these stages, H tries to prove that that last move by player 2 was not a winning move for player 2. It does so by showing that all player 2 holes are blocked (by at least one plate). For each player 2 peek hole j, at stage H j , agent H chooses a plate i ∈ [1 . . . n] and asserts that the hole is blocked by that plate using the action isBlocking i . An incorrect assertion results in a transition to an error state (c, error , ⊥). In particular, if the current state is indeed a win of player 2, then some hole j is open at all plates, and any attempt H makes to assert that it closed at a plate causes a transition to an error state. This is encoded by the following transitions. At state (H j , i , k, a) with j ∈ [1..h 2 ], we have
when either i = i (plate i is not monitored in the current state), or i = i and not Open 2 j (i, k) (the present plate is blocking player 2's hole j). On the other hand, if i = i and Open 2 j (i, k), i.e., player 2's peek hole j is not blocked by plate i, we have the transition (H j , i , k, a)
As pointed out before, the construction is designed to ensure that H knows the exact state of the game and thus can always determine whether a peek hole is blocked or not. Since we are looking for a winning strategy for player 1, if there is a win by player 2 then the present L strategy has failed. We would therefore like to insist that H must play only isBlocking i actions at this stage of the process. To ensure this, we define transitions so that all H actions other than isBlocking i cause an error transition at these stages. That is, for all H actions isOpen j and states of the form (c, i, k, a) with c ∈ {H 1 , . . . , H h 2 }, we have a transition
This completes the description of transitions from states in C × P × B × M.
Transitions from C × F The behaviour of the machine on states in C × F was described informally above. The main effect of actions is from checkwin actions performed at stage L 2 . From states with observation ⊥, the action checkwin causes an L observation of 1 or 2. For the win states we have a transition
and for the error states we have transitions
For all other cases, i.e., for c = L 2 and an action b = move j , or for c ∈ C \ {L 2 } and an action b (appropriate to stage c), we have for all r ∈ {win, error } a transition
States at which an observation of 1 or 2 has already been obtained by L act as sinks, except for scheduler moves, i.e., we have a transition
for all c ∈ C, r ∈ {win, error } and x ∈ {1, 2}.
Correctness of the construction
We now give the argument for the correctness of the encoding. We first characterize the views obtained by the agents in M (G). In the case of agent L, the structure of the possible views follows straightforwardly from the fact that the transitions as defined above follow the structure indicated in Figure 3 . Until a checkwin action is performed by L at some stage L 2 state, L observes ⊥. Once it performs that action at this stage, it will observe either 1 or 2 for the remainder of time. Thus, L views are prefixes of the sequences generated by the regular expressions
h 2 corresponds to a round in which L does not perform checkwin at stage L 2 . If α is an L view, we write Λ(α) for the subsequence of player 1 actions performed at times when the simulation is at stage L 1 , where we treat a checkwin at such a time as the action Pass.
The H views are prefixes of the sequences in the regular expression
where the observations obtained at stage H 0 are in Move 1 ∪ {⊥}, the observations obtained at stage H 1 are in Move 2 ∪ {⊥}, and all other observations before the first end are ⊥. We will show that there is a correspondence between plays of the game G and views β of H. In particular, given an H view β, let σ(β) = λ 1 . . . λ n be the subsequence of elements of Move 1 ∪ Move 2 appearing in observations. It follows from the definition of the transition relation that σ(β) is an alternating sequence of player 1 and player 2 actions. Since the moves of G have a deterministic effect on the states of G, we obtain a play (β) = ν 0
of the game G. We define ν(β) to be the final state ν n of (β). Consider an action a of H performed at an H view β at stage c. This will be recorded in the view of H, which will have the form β a o immediately after this action. We say that the action a is truthful at view β, if -β = ⊥ is the view obtained at the run s 0 , or -β contains an action isOpen j (intuitively, H has already discharged the obligation to prove that L wins), or -the stage c is in {L 0 , L 1 , ⊥} (H makes no assertion at these stages), or -c = H 0 and a = isOpen j and hole j of player 1 is open in state ν(β), i.e., ν(β) satisfies γ 1 j , or -c = H 0 and a = isBlocking j for some j (this corresponds to no assertion by H), or -c = H k for k ∈ [1 . . . h 2 ] and a = isBlocking i and not Open 2 k (i, ν(β)(i)), i.e., player 2's hole k is blocked at plate i in state ν(β).
Note that we omit the case where c = H k , k ≥ 1 and a = isOpen j ; intuitively, this corresponds to an assertion of False by H, which has an obligation to prove that the play is winning for player 1, and is failing to do so in this instance. We say that the view β is truthful if for every prefix β a o, the action a is truthful at β.
We now show that, so long as the play (β) is undecided, the knowledge set of H encodes the state ν(β). For agent u we write K u (α) for the set of final states of runs r of M (G) with view u (r) = α, representing agent u's knowledge of the state after obtaining view α. Given a stage c, a state ν of game G and a ∈ M, we let S(c, ν, a) be the set defined by S(c, ν, a) = {(c, i, ν(i), a) | i ∈ [1..n]}. Note that ν can be recovered from the set S(c, ν, a).
Proposition 3 Suppose that β is an H view in M (G) of length at least 1 such that β does not contain the observation end and (β) is an undecided play of game G. Let c be the stage reached at the end of β and let the final observation of β be a. Then if β is truthful, we have K H (β) = S(c, ν(β), a).
Proof We proceed by induction on the length of β. If β has length 1, then it arises from a run
so we have β = ⊥a H ⊥, and σ(β) is the empty sequence, corresponding to the play (β) = ν 0 . (Since we are interested in views, we use the explicit form of runs here, with actions of both H and L given, rather than the shorthand form used above, which mentioned only actions of the scheduled agents and implies that action the other agents may take all possible values.) The runs consistent with β are
where j ∈ P and a is some action of L. It is immediate that the claim holds.
Inductively, assume that β a H o is a truthful H view in M (G) such that K H (β) = S(c, ν(β), a) for some c ∈ C and a ∈ M. We need to show that K H (β a H o) = S(c , ν(β a H o) , a ) for some c ∈ C and a ∈ M. Note that 
, and there is a unique transition
Stage c = H 0 Here we have o = ⊥, and σ(β a H o) = σ(β) and ν(β a o) = ν(β). Since (β a o) is undecided, ν(β) is not a winning position for player 1. Because β a H o is truthful, we cannot have that a H is isOpen j for any j, so we must have that a H = isBlocking j for some j. For each plate i ∈ P, we have (H 0 , i, ν(β)(i), a) ∈ K H (β), and there is a transition
Stage c = L 2 Since β does not contain end, here we have o = ⊥, and L cannot have performed the action
Stage c = ⊥ Here we have that o = Pass or o = move i for some plate i = n 1 + 1 . . . n of player 2. Thus,
For each plate i ∈ P, we have (⊥, i, ν(β)(i), a) ∈ K H (β), and there is a unique transition
Stage c = H i for i = 1 . . . h 2 Here we have o = ⊥, and σ(β a H o) = σ(β) and ν(β a o) = ν(β). Since β a H o is truthful and σ(β a H o) is undecided, the position is not winning for player 2. Thus, we must have that a H = isBlocking j for some j such that not Open 2 i (j, ν(β)(j)). For each plate i ∈ P, we have (H i , i , ν(β)(i ), a) ∈ K H (β), and there is a transition
In fact, we can show this characterization of K H (β) in one further case, corresponding to the state of the simulation just after player 1 plays a winning move.
Proposition 4 Suppose that β is an H view in M (G) of length at least 1 such that β does not contain the observation end and (β) is a play in which the last move is a move of player 1 by which player 1 wins the game. Assume that no shorter prefix of β has this property and let the final observation of β be a. Then if β is truthful, we have K H (β) = S(H 0 , ν(β), a).
Proof The minimality constraint on β implies that β = β a H o where β is at stage L 1 , that (β ) is not a winning play for either player, and that o ∈ Move 1 is a move of player 1 such that (β a H o) = (β ) o − → ν(β). By Proposition 3, we obtain that K H (β ) = S(L 1 , ν(β), a) for some a. The argument for the case of c = L 1 in the proof of Proposition 4 now yields the conclusion.
Proposition 5 Suppose that r is a run of M (G) and s ∈ K H (view H (r)) is a state in C × P × B × M. Then there exists a run r of M (G) with final state s such that view H (r ) = view H (r) and view L (r ) = view L (r).
Proof By induction on the length of r. For r = s 0 , the statement is trivial, since we must have K H (view H (r)) = {s 0 }. For another base case, suppose r is the initial step of a run. In this case, H (r) ), then we must have s = (L 1 , j, ν 0 (j), ⊥) for some j. We may take
and this has the required properties.
For the induction, let
−−−−−→ t where the result holds for r 1 , which is at stage c. Let s ∈ K H (view H (r)). Since s ∈ C × P × B × M, the final observation of view H (r) is not end, and it follows that t ∈ C × P × B × M also. We have that s = (next(c), i, k, a) for some i, k, a, and arises in K H (view H (r)) from some run
with view H (r 2 ) = view H (r 1 ) and a H = a H and obs H (s) = obs H (t). Necessarily, the final state of r 2 is in C×P×B×M. Moreover, it is in K H (view H (r 2 )) = K H (view H (r 1 )). By the induction hypothesis, there exists a run r 3 ending in the same final state as r 2 , with view H (r 3 ) = view H (r 1 ) and view L (r 3 ) = view L (r 1 ). We consider the possibilities for the scheduler step c of r 1 :
-Case c = L 1 : Note that at this stage, the final L action in r can be deduced from obs H (s) = obs H (t), so in fact we have a L = a L also. Let
−−−−−→ s . This is a run because r 3 and r 2 have the same final state, and the final transition in r is identical to the final transition of the run r 2 . Then view
Transitions at these stages are independent of L, so we can switch the action of L in any transition label while keeping the states the same. So
is a run and satisfies the required properties. -Case c = L 2 : Here it follows from t ∈ C × P × B × M that a L = checkwin. Hence a L = move j for some j, and obs H (t) = obs H (s) = ⊥. For the same reasons, a L = move j for some j . The transitions for move j and move j at this stage are identical. We may therefore take
and this is a run and satisfies the required properties. -Case c = ⊥: Here transitions are independent of both players, so
is a run and satisfies the required properties.
This completes the proof of the inductive case.
We can now prove the key result that shows that G has a winning strategy for player 1 iff M (G) satisfies NDS.
Lemma 5 There exists a winning strategy for player 1 in G iff there is an L view α of M (G) and an H strategy π that excludes α in M (G).
Proof
Only If Part Assume player 1 has a winning strategy in G. As argued before, this strategy can be given by the list Λ = λ 1 , λ 3 . . . of moves of player 1. The number of moves player 1 needs to win is bounded: indeed, in every play of the game, a winning position for player 1 is eventually reached, and no winning position for player 2 is reached before this position. By Koenig's lemma, there exists a number N such in all plays of the game compatible with Λ, player 1 has won the game at the latest, just after the N -th move. Thus, we may assume that Λ = λ 1 , λ 3 . . . λ N .
We can prove that there exists an H strategy π in M (G) that excludes the L view
where a 0 denotes any letter in A − L , and each a i for i odd is the L action that corresponds to λ i at stage L 1 , i.e., a i = λ i if λ i = move j for some j, and a i = checkwin if λ i = Pass. The strategy H is defined as follows. For H views β such that the sequence of player 1 moves in σ(β) is a prefix of Λ, we let π(β) be any truthful action of H at β. In all other cases, π(β) is chosen arbitrarily.
We first need to show that π is well-defined. For this, we need to show that H is able to act truthfully whenever the sequence of player 1 moves in σ(β) is a prefix of Λ. Suppose, therefore, that the sequence of player 1 moves in σ(β) is a prefix of Λ. Then the play (β) is not winning for player 2, since Λ is a winning strategy for player 1. There are two possibilities: the play is undecided, or the play is winning for player 1. If the play (β) is undecided, then by Proposition 3, we have that K H (β) = S(c, ν(β), a). Since ν(β) is, by definition, the final state of G reached in the play σ(β), if σ(β) ends in a move of player 1 then ν(β) is not a winning state for player 1, and if σ(β) ends in a move of player 2 then ν(β) is not a winning state for player 2. In either case, depending on the stage, it is possible to select an action that is truthful at β.
In the other case, the play (β) is already winning for player 1. Let β be the smallest prefix of β such that σ(β ) is winning for player 1. Since the last action in σ(β ) is a move of player 1 (we can assume without loss of generality that the game is undecided at the initial state), must have that β is at stage H 0 , and ν(β) is a winning state for player 1. In the case that β = β, we choose π(β) to be any action isOpen j such that ν(β) satisfies γ 1 j , i.e., player 1's hole j is open at all plates in ν(β). This is then a truthful action at β. In all other cases, we choose π(β) arbitrarily. (Note that, by definition, after H's first isOpen j , any choice of H action is truthful.)
We now argue that π excludes view α. To the contrary, suppose that r is run consistent with π and view L (r) = α. Consider β = view H (r), and write this as β = β 1 a H o. Then the sequence of player 1 moves in σ(β 1 ) is Λ. Since Λ is a winning strategy for player 1, the play (β 1 ) is a winning play for player 1. Consider the shortest prefix β 2 of β 1 such that σ(β 2 ) is a winning play for player 1. Then β 2 is at stage H 1 , and there is at least one H action a and observation o such that β 2 a o is a prefix of β. (In the worst case, β 2 = β 1 and a = a H .) By construction of π, a is an action isOpen j that is truthful at β 2 . Using Proposition 4, K H (β 2 ) = S(H 1 , ν(β 2 ), a ) for some a . Because isOpen j is truthful at β 2 , we obtain that K H (β 2 a o ) = {(⊥, win, ⊥)}.
In particular, the prefix r 2 of r with view H (r 2 ) = β 2 a o has final state (⊥, win, ⊥). Since L does not perform checkwin at stage L 2 in the interim, the prefix r 1 of r with α = view L (r 1 ) checkwin 2 has final state (L 2 , win, ⊥). But then we get that the final state of r, after L performs checkwin, is (⊥, win, 1), which yields an L observation of 1 rather than the final observation 2 of α. This is a contradiction.
If Part Assume there is no winning strategy for player 1 in G. We show that there is no H strategy that can exclude any L view. To the contrary, assume an L view α that is excluded by an H strategy π. The following must hold:
1. The view α contains a checkwin action at stage L 2 . Indeed, if no checkwin action at stage L 2 occurs, then all L observations in the view must be ⊥. For any such sequence of L actions, there is always a run consistent with π yielding L observation ⊥ throughout, so that, contrary to assumption, α is not excluded by π. 2. The view α is not of the form α 1 checkwin 1(A L 1) * , with α 1 being a view at stage L 2 , and containing no prior checkwin action at stage L 2 . There is always a run consistent with π that yields such a view. Otherwise, the state s is in C × F, and must be of the form (L 2 , r, ⊥), for r ∈ {win, error }, since there
has not yet been a checkwin at stage L 2 . In this case, we obtain observation 1 at the next step by means of a transition
for both possible values of r. The resulting states with observation 1 are sinks, so we can extend these runs to obtain a run with L view α 1 checkwin 1(A L 1) * . (In either case, we may take the H action in the final transition to be the action prescribed by π, since this transition is independent of H.)
It follows that view α is in the regular set α 1 checkwin 2(A L 2) * , with α 1 being a view at stage L 2 , and containing no prior checkwin action at stage L 2 .
Let Λ = λ 1 λ 3 · · · λ N be the player 1 moves of G corresponding to the actions taken by L in α at each L 1 stage. (These are the same as the L actions, except that we treat checkwin at stage L 1 as corresponding to Pass.) The sequence Λ is a player 1 strategy in G. This strategy cannot be winning for player 1 as we have assumed that this player has no winning strategy in G. Thus, there exists some sequence λ 2 . . . λ N −1 of player 2 moves such that the play
is not winning for player 1. Let r 1 be a run consistent with π such that view L (r 1 ) = α 1 and at the m-th occurrence of stage ⊥, we take the transition
corresponding to move λ 2m by player 2. (The choices of L actions in this run come from α 1 , and the choices of H actions are fixed by the strategy π. The only nondeterminism remaining is in the initial step, where we choose the plate i to be monitored in the simulation. Since we will work at the level of the H view, any choice suffices.) Let β 1 = view H (r 1 ) be the H view obtained along this run. Note that by construction of r 1 , we obtain that (β 1 ) = is the play which is not winning for player 1.
We now argue that the view β 1 is truthful and the play (β 1 ) is also not winning for player 2. More precisely, we claim that for every prefix β a H o of β 1 , we have (1) the action a H = π(β ) is truthful at β and (2) the play (β a H o) is not winning for player 2. We proceed by induction, assuming that β is truthful and (β ) is not winning for player 2. Note that since (β ) is also not winning for player 1, we obtain by Proposition 3 that K H (β ) = S(c, ν(β ), a) for some c ∈ C and a ∈ M. We consider the possible cases for the stage c:
− − → ν m for some player 1 move λ m . Since (β ) is not winning for player 2, an extension by a player 1 move also cannot be winning for player 2. But also a H is trivially truthful at β , so both (1) and (2) hold. 2. If c = H 0 , then (β a H o) = (β ) is not winning for player 2 by assumption, so we have (2). For (1), note that if a H = isBlocking j for some j then a H is trivially truthful at β . We show that the other case, where a H = isOpen j for some j, is not possible, because it leads to a contradiction. Note (β ) is also not a winning play for player 1, so ν(β ) is not a winning position for player 1, and there exists a plate i ∈ P for which not Open 1 j (i, ν(β )(i)). This means that for the state s = (c, i, ν(β )(i), a) ∈ S(c, ν(β ), a) = K H (β ), we have a transition
It follows using Proposition 5 that there exists a run r ending in state (L 1 , error , ⊥) with view H (r ) = β a H o and view L (r ) a prefix of α 1 . The run r is necessarily consistent with π because β is consistent with π. Following the actions dictated for L and H by α 1 and π, respectively, we may extend this to a longer run r 1 , still consistent with π, with view L (r 1 ) = α 1 , also ending in state (L 1 , error , ⊥). But then the next checkwin step allows a transition to (⊥, error , 2), and we obtain a run with L view α, a contradiction. 3. If c = L 2 , then a H is trivially truthful, and (β a H o) = (β ) is not winning for player 2 by assumption. 4. For stages c = H k with k ∈ {1 . . . h 2 }, we have that (β a H o) = (β ). It is immediate that (β a H o) is not winning for either player, and it remains to show that a H is truthful at β . As noted above, the assumption that β is truthful, together with the assumption that (β ) is not a winning play for either player, implies that K H (β ) = S(c, ν(β ), a), by Proposition 3. We will show that the desired conclusion that a H is truthful at β follows from the weaker assumption that β is truthful and K H (β ) = S(c, ν(β ), a): this helps with the argument for case c = ⊥, which is handled below.
Note first that a H cannot be isOpen j , since the final state of the prefix r of r with view H (r ) = β is in S(c, ν(β ), a), hence in C × P × B × M. so the action isOpen j results in a transition to the state (next(c), error , ⊥) in r. It follows that the final state of r 1 is (L 2 , error , ⊥), and then the subsequent action checkwin produces a run consistent with π with view α, contrary to the assumption that π excludes α. Hence a H = isBlocking j for some j. Suppose that Open 2 k (j, ν(β )(j)). Since K H (β ) = S(c, ν(β ), a), we have that (c, j, ν(β )(j), a) ∈ K H (β ). By Proposition 5, there exists a run r ending in state (c, j, ν(β )(j), a) with view H (r ) = β and view L (r ) a prefix of α 1 . The transition (c, j, ν(β )(j), a)
extends this to a run whose L view remains a prefix of α 1 , and by following strategy π and the remaining L actions in α 1 we may continue to extend to the point where we obtain a run r 1 with view L (r 1 ) = α 1 and final state (L 2 , error , ⊥). But then the next checkwin step allows a transition to (⊥, error , 2), and we obtain a run consistent with π with L view α, a contradiction. Thus, in fact, we must have not Open 2 k (j, ν(β )(j)), so that a H is truthful at β , as required. For the purposes of the next case, we make one further conclusion. Note that by definition of the transitions for isBlocking j at stage H k , we get from
, so we preserve the weakened assumption. Thus, since the above argument applies for all k = 1 . . . h 2 , we have that for all such k, there exists j such that not Open 
We therefore satisfy the weakened assumption for the stages H 1 . . . H h 2 in the previous case. It therefore follows using the argument of the previous case that ν(β a H o) = ν m cannot be a winning position of player 2. Thus, from the assumption that (β ) is not winning for either player, we obtain that (β a H o) is not winning for either player.
This completes the argument that β 1 is truthful and (β 1 ) is not a winning play for either player. By Proposition 3, we obtain that K H (β 1 ) = S(c, ν(β 1 ), a) for some a. In particular, the final state of r 1 must be in C × P × B × M, and the next checkwin action then results in a run consistent with π with L view α, a contradiction.
Again, we point out that the hardness result holds for scheduled machines already.
Synchronous Bisimulation-based Notions
In this section we establish the result:
Theorem 6 For the class of finite state synchronous machines, RES is in PTIME.
The following Lemma shows that in searching for an unwinding relation on a machine M , it suffices to consider equivalence relations on the reachable states of M .
Lemma 6
1. If there exists a synchronous unwinding relation on M , then there exists a largest such relation, which is transitive. 2. If all states in M are reachable then the largest synchronous unwinding relation (if one exists) is an equivalence relation. 3. A system satisfies RES iff its restriction to its reachable states satisfies RES.
Proof 1. First we show that the set of synchronous unwinding relations on M is closed under union. Let ∼ 1 and ∼ 2 be two unwinding relations on M . Clearly Items 1 and 2 of Def. 5 hold for ∼ 1 ∪ ∼ 2 . Item 3 holds as well as if s ∼ 1 ∪ ∼ 2 t then either s ∼ 1 t or s ∼ 2 t holds. Assume s ∼ 1 t, then as ∼ 1 is an unwinding relation, by Item 3 of Def. 5, it follows that for all a 1 , a 2 ∈ A H and a 3 ∈ A L , if s − −−−−− → t and s ∼ 1 t , which implies s ∼ 1 ∪ ∼ 2 t . This implies that there exists a largest unwinding relation.
Second, the composition of two unwinding relations is an unwinding relation. Again Items 1 and 2 of Def. 5 hold for ∼ 1 • ∼ 2 . Assume s ∼ 1 • ∼ 2 t. In this case there is some x such that s ∼ 1 x and x ∼ 2 t. As ∼ 1 is un unwinding relation, by Item 3 of Def. 5, for any a 1 , a 2 ∈ A H and a 3 ∈ A L , if s − −−−−− → x and x ∼ 1 t . As x ∼ 2 t, and as ∼ 2 is an unwinding relation, Item 3 Def. 5 applied with a 1 = a 2 implies there exists some t such that t (a 2 ,a 3 ) − −−−−− → t and x ∼ 2 t .
Putting it all together, there is some t such that t (a 2 ,a 3 ) − −−−−− → t and some x such that s ∼ 1 x ∼ 2 t i.e., s ∼ 1 • ∼ 2 t . It follows that the transitive closure of any synchronous unwinding relation is a synchronous unwinding relation. In particular, the largest such relation must be transitive. 2. Let ∼ be the largest synchronous unwinding relation. By definition and the Item 1 above, we already have that ∼ is symmetric and transitive, so it suffices to show reflexivity. Let s be a reachable state. In this case there is a run s 0 a 1 s 1 . . . a n s n of M such that s = s n . We need to show that s ∼ s. The proof is by induction on the length of the run. The base case of s 0 ∼ s 0 is immediate from Item 1 of Def. 5. Suppose
−−−−→ s n+1 . As s n ∼ s n , and applying Item 3 of Def. 5 to the right handside copy of s n , there exists a transition s n a n+1 −−−−→ s for some s and s i+1 ∼ s . Because ∼ is symmetric, we have s ∼ s n+1 , and by transitivity s n+1 ∼ s n+1 . 3. Any synchronous unwinding relation is still a synchronous unwinding relation when restricted to the reachable states. Conversely, given a synchronous unwinding relation on the reachable states, the (identical) relation which extends this to all states by union with the empty relation on unreachable states is also a synchronous unwinding relation.
Using Lemma 6, we can design an algorithm to compute the largest synchronous unwinding relation, or the empty relation if none exists. By part (3) of Lemma 6 we may assume that all the states of the machine M = S, A, s 0 , →, O, obs are reachable.
The algorithm is an adaptation of the algorithm for calculating the relational coarsest partition by Kanellakis and Smolka [KS83] . For a partition P or equivalence relation ≈, we write [s] P or [s] ≈ for the equivalence class containing element s. We say that a partition P of the state space S is stable if the corresponding equivalence relation ∼ P satisfies condition (3) of Def. 5.
2 The idea of the algorithm is to compute the coarsest stable partition satisfying condition (2) of Def. 5, by iteratively refining an existing partition if the latter is not stable. Given the current partition P , if there exists a (reachable) state s such that condition (3) of Def. 5 is not satisfied with t = s, the algorithm terminates and returns the empty relation: this follows from Lemma 6.(2) because reflexivity is a necessary condition for the existence of an unwinding relation. Otherwise, we check whether it is stable for s = t. If it is, we have found the largest unwinding relation. If not, we refine the current partition based on the counterexample found.
The procedure is given by Algorithm 1. In each refinement step, with the current partition equal to P , we first compute the set
−−−−−→ t} for each state s, and L action a L and H action a H . Rule (3) with respect to ∼ P is equivalent to the statement that if s ∼ P t then R(s, a H , a L ) = R(t, a H , a L ) for all L actions a L and H actions a H , a H . We first check this when s = t. Note that once this condition has been verified, we have verified that R(s, a H , a L ) does not depend on the second argument a H . To check the non-reflexive cases, it therefore suffices to check the condition with respect to any fixed a H .
We can now prove Theorem 6:
Proof (of Theorem 6) Algorithm 1 terminates when no split occurs in the main loop. Since, when a split occurs, the new partition is a strict refinement of the previous one, the number of iterations of the main loop is at most |S|. For each p ∈ P , computing the function R can be done in time O((|A H |×|A L |×|p|)+|p · − → |). and Smolka has shown how to optimize their algorithm using careful scheduling, union-find data stuctures and amortized analysis, as well as parallel implementation. Similar optimizations may be applicable to our algorithm, but we will not pursue this here.) To argue correctness, we first show that if there exists a synchronous unwinding ∼ on M , corresponding to partition P ∼ , the algorithm maintains the invariant that P ∼ is a refinement of P . That this holds for the initial value of P follows from condition (2) of Def. 5. The only case where P changes value is where we have p ∈ P and a 3 ∈ A L with 1. R(s, a 1 , a 3 ) = R(s, a 2 , a3) for all s ∈ p and a 1 , a 2 ∈ A H , (there are no reflexivity violations), and 2. R(s, a H , a 3 ) = R(t, a H , a 3 ) for some s, t ∈ p and a H ∈ A H .
In this case, we obtain the new value P for P by splitting p into the collection {[s] ≈ a 3 | s ∈ p}, where ≈ a 3 is defined on p by s ≈ a 3 t if R(s, a H , a 3 ) = R(t, a H , a 3 ). Suppose that P ∼ is not a refinement of P . Since the only element of P that changed was p, we must have s, t ∈ p with s ∼ t and R(s, a H , a 3 ) = R(t, a H , a 3 ). The latter means that there exists p ∈ P with (without loss of generality) p ∈ R(s, a H , a 3 ) and p ∈ R(t, a H , a 3 ).
That is, there exists s ∈ p such that s − −−−− → t and s ∼ t . But because P ∼ refines P , this implies that t ∈ [s ] P = p , a contradiction. We conclude that in fact P refines P .
The correctness argument now follows straightforwardly. Suppose that the algorithm outputs ∅: we show that there exists no synchronous unwinding on M . Suppose to the contrary that ∼ is a synchronous unwinding. At the time the algorithm terminates, we have R(s, a 1 , a 3 ) = R(s, a 2 , a3) for some p ∈ P , some s ∈ p and some a 1 , a 2 ∈ A H . Without loss of generality, there exists some p ∈ P and t ∈ S such that s (a 1 ,a 3 ) − −−−− → t ∈ p but there exists no t ∈ p such that s − −−−− → t and t ∼ t . Because P ∼ is a refinement of P , we obtain t ∈ [t] P = p , a contradiction. We conclude that there exists no synchronous unwinding.
Conversely, suppose that the algorithm outputs a partition P = ∅, and let ∼ P be the corresponding equivalence relation. Since P is a refinement of {obs −1 L (o) | o ∈ O}, we have that s ∼ P t implies obs L (s) = obs L (t), so condition (2) of Def. 5 is satisfied. Moreover, we have, for all p ∈ P , that 1. R(s, a 1 , a 3 ) = R(s, a 2 , a3) for all s ∈ p and a 1 , a 2 ∈ A H , 2. R(s, a H , a 3 ) = R(t, a H , a 3 ) for all s = t ∈ p and a H ∈ A H .
Together, these imply that ∼ P satisfies condition (3) of Def. 5. Finally, since P is a partition, we have s 0 ∼ P s 0 , so condition (1) also holds.
Related Work
In asynchronous machines the verification complexities of NDI and NDS are both PSPACE-complete, and RES (based on asynchronous unwinding) is in polynomial time [FG95, FG96, vdMZ07] . Interestingly, PSPACE is also the complexity result for verifying Mantel's BSP conditions [Man00a] on asynchronous finite state systems. For (asynchronous) push-down systems, the verification problem is undecidable [DHK + 08]. A number of works have defined notions of security for synchronous or timed systems, but fewer complexity results are known. Köpf and Basin [KB06] define a notion similar to RES and show it is PTIME decidable. Similar definitions are also used in the literature on language-based security [Aga00, VS97].
Focardi et al.
[FGM00] define a spectrum of definitions related to ours in a timed process algebraic setting, and state a decidability result for one of them, close to our notion NDS. However, this result concerns an approximation to the notion "timed nondeducibility on compositions" (tBNDC) that is their real target, and they do not give a complexity result. Beauquier and Lanotte defined covert channels in timed systems with tick transitions by using strategies [BL06] . They prove that the problem of the existence of a covert channel in such systems is decidable. However, their definition of covert channel requires that H and L have strategies to force a system into sets of runs with disjoint sets of L views. The induced definition on free of covert channels appears to be a weaker notion than NDS.
Conclusion
We remarked above that nondeducibility-based notions of security may have the disadvantage that they do not readily support a compositional approach to secure systems development, motivating the introduction of unwinding-based definitions of security. The complexity results of the present paper can be interpreted as lending further support to the value of unwinding-based definitions. We have found that the two nondeducibility notions we have considered, while both decidable, are intractable. On the other hand, the unwinding-based notion of synchronous restrictiveness has tractable complexity. This makes this definition a more appropriate basis for automated verification of security. Even if the desired security property is nondeducibility on inputs or nondeducibility on strategies, it is sufficient to verify that a system satisfies synchronous restrictiveness, since this is a stronger notion of security. It remains to be seen whether there is a significant number of practical systems that are secure according to the nondeducibility-based notions, but for which there does not exist a synchronous unwinding. If so, then an alternate methodology needs to be applied for the verification of security for such systems.
